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I. INTRODUCTION
A small provision in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 19881 is a potential bombshell to the unwary foreigner
investing in the United States. Known as the Exon-Florio
Amendment, 2 this provision authorizes the President of the United
States to investigate and block certain types of foreign investments
which might threaten to impair U.S. national security.' However,
neither Exon-Florio, nor the corresponding Conference Report4
give a clear indication as to what types of foreign investments are
subject to scrutiny5 or, more importantly, what constitutes a threat
to national security.6
In an apparent effort to limit the potential impact of
Exon-Florio on foreign investment,7 former President Ronald
Reagan charged the Department of Treasury with the task of
promulgating regulations to implement the Amendment.8 However,
1. Pub. L No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988).
2. Id. at 1425 (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988)) (amending title 7 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2169) [hereinafter Exon-Florio]. Exon-Florin is
named after its primary sponsors, Sen. James Exon and Rep. J. Florio, now the Governor of New
Jersey.
3. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2170(a)-(b).
4. H.R. CONF. Rm'. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 514 (1988) [hereinafter Conference
Report], reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONa. & ADMIN. NEws 1547.
5. Although Exon-Florio is labeled, "Authority to review certain mergers, acquisitions, and
takeovers," the language of the statue implicates any transaction which transfers control of a
domestic company to foreign persons. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c). These key terms potentially include
transactions not usually regarded as mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers; for example, lending, where
a lender retains the power to exercise control over the borrower on the occurrence of certain specified
conditions.
6. The Conference Report merely notes that the term "national security" will be interpreted
broadly, without limitation to a particular industry. Conference Report, supra note 4, at 926.
7. See Dermin, Getting a Transaction Past CFIUS: A Businessman's Guide to Exon-Florio,
6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 375 (1989) (LEXIS, Itrade library, Intrad file) (Congress
intended to make the Department of Commerce the central agency in Exon-Florlo review, arguably
because of the Department's inherent favoritism toward American industry, which was stifled by
President Reagan, who gave control of implementing Exon-Florio to the Department of the Treasury,
which, some contend, has an institutional bias in maintaining the free flow of investment capital into
the United States).
8. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779, § 3-201 (1989) (Authority to issue regulations
implementing Exon-Florio, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g), was delegated to the Chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), in consultation with other
members of the Committee). The Committee Chairperson is the Secretary of the Treasury. Exec.
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the Proposed Regulations which emerged9 raise additional
questions about whether any defined limitations on the potential
scope of Exon-Florio actually exist. While the Bush Administration
has vowed to maintain an open-door policy to foreign investors, 0
a major concern is that a future administration may not be as
restrained." In addition, the lack of judicial review over the
President's decision to enforce Exon-Florio significantly increases
the possibility of inconsistent and arbitrary decisions.12
Foreign investors who ignore the potential impact of
Exon-Florio face a very uncertain future. As China National
Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC)
discovered in early 1990, even completing a corporate acquisition
will not protect the transaction from potential divestiture under
Exon-Florio."3 The Proposed Regulations make clear that the
President has the authority to force foreign persons to divest their
holdings of a U.S. company if foreign control of that entity could
threaten to impair national security. 4 In addition, under the
Order No. 11,858,40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975), amended by Exec. Order No. 12,188,45 Fed. Reg.
989 (1980), and by Exec. Order No. 12,661, supra, § 3-201.
9. 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744 (1989) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800) (proposed July 14, 1989)
[hereinafter Proposed Regulations].
10. See President's Message to the Congress on the China National Aero-Technology Import
and Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Incorporated, 25 WEEKLY COMP.
PRns. Doc. 164 (Feb. 1, 1990) [hereinafter President's Message Regarding MAMCO] (Press
Secretary, Marlin Fitzwater, said that the U.S. "welcomes foreign investment in this country; it
provides foreign investors fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory treatment. This administration is
committed to maintaining that policy.").
11. Liebeler, YetAnother Reason Not to Invest in the U.S., Wall St. J., Aug. 30,1989, at AlO,
col. 8. For example, every successor to the administration could unilaterally re-interpret the meaning
of national security, thus either contracting or expanding the number and types of transactions subject
to review under Exon-Florio. Such unchecked decision-making heightens the potential for arbitrary
and inconsistent restrictions on foreign investment under Exon-Florio.
12. See SO U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (Determinations under § 2170(d) are immune from
judicial review).
13. President Bush, pursuant to authority delegated to him under Exon-Florio, ordered CATIC
to divest its holdings of MAMCO, Inc., a Seattle, Washington, manufacturer of metal aircraft
components, on grounds that the purchase might threaten to impair national security. President's
Message Regarding MAMCO, supra note 10. See infra notes 129-37 (discussing CATIC's forced
divestiture of MAMCO, Inc.).
14. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, §§ 800.601(c)-(d) (Authority to divest a merger,
acquisition or takeover shall remain available at the discretion of the President at any time unless the
Committee has determined not to investigate the acquisition or the President has previously
determined to exercise his authority under Exon-Florio with respect to that acquisition).
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Proposed Regulations the President has the authority, for an
indefinite period of time, to reevaluate and force the divestiture of
an acquisition which has been previously reviewed by the
Committee. 5 Exon-Florio and the Proposed Regulations have
combined to create a formidable obstacle for any foreigner
intending to invest in the U.S., and should be carefully scrutinized.
This comment is intended to provide an in-depth look at the
Exon-Florio Amendment along with its practical and legal
implications on the foreign investor. Part II of this comment
provides a brief history of foreign investment in the United States
and how certain changes in foreign investment patterns during the
1980s lead to the passage of Exon-Florio. Part Ill examines
Exon-Florio itself and the corresponding regulations proposed by
the Department of Treasury. Finally, Part IV explores proposed
changes to Exon-Florio and the impact such changes may have on
the foreign investor.
II. FOREIGN INVESTMENT PRIOR TO EXON-FLORIO
A. The Origins of Foreign Investment in the U.S.
To say that foreign investment16 in the United States has
increased in the last decade would be a colossal understatement.17
15. See Id. § 800.601(e) (The President may subsequently review a completed and reviewed
transaction if the notice given to the Committee contains false or misleading information, or omitted
material information).
16. Foreign investment is defined as either direct or indirect. Direct investment includes a
wide range of business activities; all of which result in the exercise of some degree of management
control over the enterprise. The purchase of an existing business, the formation of a new business,
a joint venture, and a partnership are all examples of direct investment. Indirect investment is
generally more passive in nature; for example, portfolio investment or lending. Shepro, Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States: A Legal Ana/ysis, 4 Wis. IRT'L LJ. 46, 47-49, & 47 n.4
(1985). While Exon-Florio arguably applies only to direct investment, a broad interpretation of the
Proposed Regulations could subject certain lending transactions to review under the statute.
Richardson & Larschan, U.S. Tries to Tail Foreign Buyers, MANHATrAN LAW., Sept. 19, 1989, at
13 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Mnlawr file).
17. Foreign direct investment in the U.S. soared from $83 billion in 1980 to $329 billion in
1988. Ford-Jaguar DealAssuages U.S. Fears About Foreign Investment, Reuter Bus. Rep., Nov. 9,
1989 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Bus file). Foreign firms account for 20% of the $2 trillion national debt
and control 21% of U.S. banking. Forde, As Foreign Firms Go Shopping in US, Banks Here Want
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However, this phenomenon was not entirely a product of the 1980s.
Actually, foreign investment has played a major role in developing
the U.S. economy since the end of the War of Independence."3
Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures in 1791 set the tone
for U.S. amenability towards foreign investment. 19 In 1803,
foreign ownership of U.S. assets amounted to nearly one-half of all
public and private securities.2" Considerable foreign ownership of
U.S. assets, as well as foreign purchases of large amounts of
government bonds,21 continued for most of the Nineteenth
Century, contributing to the building of the U.S. industrial base.'
to Help, Am. Banker, July 19, 1988, at 72 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fin file). Foreign interests now
control 4% of the U.S. economy. No New Restrictions Needed on Foreign Direct Investment, Study
Says, Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA), Dec. 12, 1989, at A-7 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fin file). Contrary to
popular belief, Britain is by far the largest investor in the United States possessing roughly 30% of
foreign-owned assets; Japan is a distant second with 16%. Buy America While Stocks Last,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 1989, at 63. As recently as 1982, the U.S. was the largest creditor nation; since
1985 it has been the largest debtor nation. Foreign Debt Widened 40% in '88, Facts on File, World
News Digest, July 7, 1989, at 497 F2 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fin file).
18. See SuB. COMM. ECON. STABLJZATION OF THE COMM. ON BANKIONG, FINANCE AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG., IST SEss., FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: EFFECTs ON THE UNrTED
STATES 48-79 (Comm. Print 101-2, 1989) [hereinafter Subcommittee Report] (Seitzinger, Foreign
Investment in the United States: Major Federal Restrictions) (In an effort to provide a suitable arena
for foreign investors, the new U.S. government quickly resolved foreign claims to assure credit
worthiness. The Jay Treaty, for example, stated that the U.S. would compensate the British for any
loss of property and outstanding debt resulting from the War of Independence).
19. See id. at 50 ("It is not impossible that there may be persons disposed to look with a
jealous eye on the introduction of foreign capital, as if it were an instrument to deprive our own
citizens of the profits of our own industry; but, perhaps, there never could be a more unreasonable
jealousy. Instead of being viewed as a rival, it ought to be considered as a most valuable auxiliary,
conducing to put in motion a greater quantity of productive labor, and greater portion of useful
enterprise, than could exist without it.").
20. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 20 (Jackson, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Assets:
Past, Present, and Prospects) "[A]imost one-half of American public and private securities were to
be found in foreign portfolios. Total security issues came to $129,700,000 of which $59,250,000 were
in foreign hands and $34,700,000 were held by British investors. The Federal debt stood at
$81,000,000; foreign ownership accounted for $43,000,000 of this.... Amusingly enough, even the
purchase of Louisiana by the United States in the same year was made possible only because actual
cash payments Napoleon demanded were raised largely in London. The Louisiana bond issue was
$11,250,000; $9,250,000 was taken by the English." Id
21. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 51 (Seitzinger, Foreign Investment in the
United States: Major Federal Restrictions) ("By the middle of the nineteenth century, foreigners held
half of the Federal and State and one-quarter of the municipal debts").
22. Between 1817 and 1825, the State of New York issued $7 million in bonds, probably
one-half of which was foreign owned. These bonds financed the Erie Canal project, among others.
Jackson, supra note 20, at 21.
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By the end of the century, U.S. dependence on foreign capital
began to wane as the country emerged as a world industrial power.
In 1915, the U.S. became a net creditor nation for the first time.'
After the Second World War, the U.S. also became the largest
exporter of capital.U
Foreign investment began a resurgence in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.' As a result of the decline in the U.S. dollar and
reduced stock prices, American companies became available at
bargain prices.26  A corresponding foreign buildup of large
quantities of U.S. currency,27 which were most easily reduced by
investing in the U.S., served to spark the resurgence of foreign
investment in the U.S.2 8 However, this growth of foreign
investment was not well received by the American public, or
Congress. 29 Their concerns rested predominantly on their fear of
being unable to control the conduct of the foreign entity as it
related to the economy, the American people, and the national
security.3
The last major increase of foreign capital occurred between
1980 and 1988. During this period, the amount of foreign
investment in the U.S. nearly quadrupled to almost $1.8 trillion, an
23. A debtor, as opposed to a creditor nation, is a nation which has accumulated foreign
liabilities (direct and indirect investments) that exceed the nation's foreign assets. Subcommittee
Report, supra note 18, at 1 (Elwell, The Growing U.S. External Debt: Nature and Implications).
24. Press Conference, Economic Strategy Institute, Fed. News Serv., May 13, 1991, §
Commerce and Trade Speeches or Conferences (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednew file) (quoting Clyde
Prestowitz, president of the Economic Strategy Institute).
25. See Note, The Rising Tde of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative Breakwater Violate U.S.
Treaty Commitments?, 72 MICH. L R v. 551 (1974) (Total foreign direct investment in the U.S.
increased 93%, from $6.9 billion in 1960 to $13.3 billion in 1970).
26. Id.
27. This was particularly true with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), which, as a result of their self-induced oil crisis, realized a great deal of wealth,
predominantly in U.S. currency. These so-called "petrodollars" were then used to acquire assets
within the U.S. Press Conference, Economic Strategy Institute, supra note 24.
28. See Note, supra note 25, at 552.
29. See id. at553-554, 553 n.12, 554 n.15 (citing H.R. 8951,93rd Cong., Ist Sess. § 3 (1973))
(H.R. 8951 attempted to amend the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to prohibit non-U.S. citizens
from acquiring more than 5% of the voting securities of any issuer registered under the Act, and to
prohibit non-U.S. citizens from owning more than 35% of nonvoting securities of any U.S. company).
30. See id. at 554-556 (describing the concerns in the 1970s of Congress and the American
people, which rested primarily on the socio-political consequences arising from foreign control of
U.S. companies).
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amount equal to approximately 6% of all U.S. wealth.31 In 1988,
the U.S. became the world's largest debtor nation.32 However, as
distinguished from prior periods of increased foreign investment in
the U.S., since the early 1970s the global market has been
structured with floating currency exchange rates.33 Foreign capital
inflows during the 1980s resulted from high real U.S. interest
rates.34 The high level of interest rates in the U.S. during the
1980s were caused by the lack of both domestic savings and
domestic investment. A nation whose domestic savings are
outstripped by current investment requirements generally increases
interest rates to attract needed capital from abroad.3 5  Since
nationial capital sources are not available, businesses seeking capital
for expansion pursue foreign sources. If foreign capital is attracted
to augment domestic savings, overall economic growth can be
maintained, but at the expense of affecting the trade sector.36 Two
major factors prompting the inflow of foreign capital during the
1980s were (1) the excessive budget deficits by both federal and
state governments, which absorbed a large portion of domestic
31. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at vii (Jackson, Introduction and Summary).
32. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 39 (Jackson, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Assets:
Past, Presen4 and Prospects).
33. Id at 31-32. The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944 established a fixed currency exchange
system. Each nation was supposed to buy and sell its own currency to keep the price of the currency
at the officially established rate of exchange. The official rate of all currency was pegged to the
dollar, which was pegged to gold. In the early 1970s, the U.S. abandoned its efforts to maintain the
dollar's value in relation to gold, effectively terminating the gold standard of fixed exchange rates.
P. HEYNE, TNE ECONOMIC WAY Op THINmO 419-21 (4th ed. 1983). The perceived problem with
fixed exchange rates was that when the market believed an exchange rate was untenable, enormous
flows of speculative funds shifted from one currency to another. Jackson, supra note 20, at 32. The
U.S. adopted instead a floating exchange system in which each nation's currency would fluctuate or
float in response to the changing expectations of buyers and sellers. P. H Nv, supra, at 421.
34. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 32 (Jackson, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Assets:
Pas4 Present and Prospects). Real, as opposed to nominal, interest rates do not reflect any
expectation of inflation. P. HEYNF, supra note 33, at 435.
35. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 32 (Jackson, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Assets:
Pas Present and Prospects).
36. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 6 (Eiwell, The Growing U.S. Evternal Debt:
Nature and Implications) (Foreigners who wish buy an American asset denominated in dollars must
first convert their currency to dollars. This transaction increases the demand for dollars raising the
value of the dollar relative to other currencies. As the exchange rate for dollars increases, the price
of American assets climbs, and the price of foreign goods in the U.S. decreases, thus increasing
imports and decreasing exports moving the trade balance towards deficit).
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savings, and (2) an actual decrease in domestic savings. 7
Compounding this situation, many of the U.S. trading partners
practiced fiscal restraint and enjoyed surplus domestic savings in
relation to domestic investment, thus further encouraging the inflow
of capital to the U.S.38
The rise in the value of the U.S. dollar during the early 1980s
both helped and hindered direct investment in the United States.
The increased value of the dollar made equities more expensive,
but also increased fears that the U.S. would adopt protectionist
legislation to reduce trade deficits, thereby encouraging a "buy
while you can philosophy." '39 However, as the dollar continued to
strengthen in the mid-1980s, and foreign investment failed to abate,
it became apparent that foreign investors were attracted to the U.S.
market for other reasons. Historical stability, both politically and
economically, as well as the size of the consumer market have
often been cited as the alluring factors of the U.S. market.
40
Similarly, foreign direct investment is a means of avoiding the
effects of some already enacted protectionist legislation.4'
B. Restrictions on Foreign Investment in the U.S.
Perhaps the most attractive feature of the U.S. market, in sharp
contrast to some of its major economic partners,42 is the relatively
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Shepro, supra note 16, at 50.
40. The stability and size of the U.S. consumer market have been such an attraction that
foreign investors have often been willing to pay a premium for access to it. Foreign Investment in
America; T"ime to Kick the Tyres, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 1989, at 76. The Department of Commerce
estimated that in 1988 foreigners earned only 5.6% on the net worth of their direct investments in
the U.S. Id. In particular, the British, the largest investors in the U.S., did the best with 8%. The
Japanese, the second largest, did the worst with only a 3.3% return, which in part may be due to
Japanese practices of inflating the transfer price of goods brought to the U.S. Id.
41. For example, the Buy America Act requires the U.S. government to purchase American
products for public use within the United States. 41 U.S.C. § 10d (1982). Shepro, supra note 16, at
50.
42. In what may be one of history's great ironies, Japan and Germany, the two countries
defeated in World War I[ and rebuilt with the help of U.S. investment in the 1950s and 1960s, have
become the leading trade competitors of the U.S. Garten, Japan and Germany: American Concerns,
FOREIGN AFF. 84 (1989-90) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Intnew file). In contrast to the traditional open
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few government restrictions placed on foreign investment.43 The
restrictions on foreign investment in effect prior to Exon-Florio
deal predominantly with information gathering.' However,
market policies of the U.S., Japan and Germany maintain tight control of their economies. Japan's
main policy has been to protect its economy by allowing the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MIT) to guide the economy. Japan's control over the
economy has been accomplished by subsidizing and regulating major industries. For example, of the
$3 billion in cash paid by Sony for the acquisition of Columbia Pictures, $2 billion was lent to Sony
by the Bank of Japan, subsidized by the government at 1.75 % interest. 136 CONG. REC. H2038 (daily
ed. May 3, 1990). In addition, information provided to the Japanese government, as part of the
extensive reporting requirements imposed on foreign investors in that country, is made publicly
available to the Japanese business community so that businessmen and investors may make informed
financial decisions. 134 CONG. REc. H9603 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988). Japan also has many societal
barriers to foreign investment such as cross-equity holdings and substantial bank holdings in
industrial companies, making acquisition by foreigners extremely difficult. Garten, supra. The end
result is a controlled strategy to protect the Japanese economy from foreign access; making Japan
clearly the least open country. No New Restrictions Needed on Foreign Direct Investmen4 Study Says,
supra note 17. Germany's policy has been to maintain low inflation, even at the cost of significant,
long-term unemployment. Garten, supra. Like Japan, banks hold shares in industrial companies thus
creating powerful financial-industrial conglomerates that are extremely difficult for foreigners to
penetrate. ld4 In addition, like Japan, German businesses emphasize large institutional owners over
individual shareholders allowing for controlled strategies against foreign acquisitions. Id. The German
financial structure and substantial government regulations combine to make foreign takeovers a rare
occurrence. Id
43. Shepro, supra note 16, at 51. The application of U.S. laws to foreign persons is not
impeded by international law. Note, supra note 25, at 557 (citing W. Bishop, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CAsES AND MATEams 535 (3d ed. 1971)) ("Generally speaking a state has jurisdiction over all
persons and property within its territory"). The absolute power of a sovereign's jurisdiction over
persons and property within its borders is well established in U.S. case law. Id. (citing Schooner
Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812)).
44. Shepro, supra note 16, at 51. For example, the International Investment Survey Act of
1976 requires a fairly comprehensive disclosure of information to the Department of Commerce on
foreign direct investment, as well as requiring foreign portfolio investments to be reported to the
Department of Treasury. Id. (citing 22 U.S.C. § 3101 (1982)). The information, however, is to be
used only for statistical purposes. Id (citing 31 C.F.R. § 129). Additionally, the Agricultural Foreign
Investment Disclosure Act of 1978 requires any foreign person who acquires or transfers any interest,
other than a security interest, in agricultural land to submit a report to the Secretary of Agriculture
within 90 days of the transaction. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 58 (Seitzinger, Foreign
Investment in the United States: Major Federal Restrictions) (citing 7 U.S.C. §. 3501 (1982)). The
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended by the Domestic and Foreign Investment
Improved Disclosure Act of 1977, requires anyone who acquires 5 % or more of the equity securities
of a U.S. company to register the transaction with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
including such information as their citizenship and residence, I at 58 (citing Pub. L. No. 95-213).
The Federal Reserve Board imposes reporting requirements on foreign banks engaged in banking or
related activities in the U.S. Essaye & Turza, The Next Step in Regulating Foreign Investment,
N.Y.LJ., Feb. 1, 1990, at 5 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lginew file). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act requires
parties to a merger or acquisition that exceed certain size requirements to file with the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Shepro, supra note 16, at 61 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18(a)
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Congress does afford protection to particular industries within the
U.S. because of the particular impact each has on national security.
Among such regulated industries are communications,
45
aviation,46  shipping, 47  energy resources,48  minerals,l49  ands,
50
banking,5 and defense contracting.52
(1982)).
45. Federal restrictions on communications are extensive. No broadcast, common carrier,
aeronautical en route, or aeronautical fixed radio station license will be granted to or allowed to be
held by any alien or representative thereof if the public interest will be served by the refusal or
revocation of the license. This restriction also applies to any corporation organized under the laws
of a foreign nation, having any directors or officers who are aliens, having more than 20% of its
capital stock owned or voted by aliens or their representatives, or otherwise controlled by an alien
or foreign nation. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 67 (Seitzinger, Foreign Investment in the
United States: Major Federal Restrictions) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 310(b)).
46. The U.S. poses stringent restrictions on the flights of foreign aircraft. In particular, any
aircraft not registered may not operate or navigate in U.S. airspace; registration is limited to U.S.
citizens and citizens of foreign nations on a reciprocical basis. l at 64 (citing 49 U.S.C. app. §
1401(a)). Any acquisition of control over a U.S. citizen or business substantially engaged in the
business of aeronautics must be first approved by the Department of Justice. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1378).
47. Three major maritime laws create barriers to foreign investment. IL at 59-60 (citing
Shipping Act of 1920,46 U.S.C. § 911; Merchant Marine Act of 1929, Pub. L. No. 66-261,41 Stat.
988 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 861-89 (Supp. V 1987)); Merchant Marine Act of
1936, Pub. L. No. 74-835, 49 Stat. 1985 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 861-89 (Supp.
V 1987)). Each of these statutes contribute to the restriction of foreign persons from owning merchant
ships, from being eligible for documentation in the U.S., from fishing in U.S. waters, from towing
or salvaging operations in U.S. waters, and from various other operations within U.S. coastal waters.
Id.
48. Licenses for the construction, operation, or maintenance of facilities for the development,
transmission, and utilization of power on land and water over which the federal government has
control may be issued only to U.S. citizens and domestic corporations. Id at 66 (citing 16 U.S.C. §
797(e) (1982)). Additionally, a foreign citizen, or a corporation believed to be controlled by a foreign
citizen or government, may not acquire a license for nuclear facilities. Id at 66 (citing Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2281 (1988))).
49. Generally, the mining restrictions derive from the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920. Id
at 65 (citing Pub. L. No. 66-146, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287
(1988))). This Act requires U.S. citizenship or corporate formation within a state of the U.S. before
leases will be granted for mining on federal land. Foreign citizens will be allowed to acquire an
interest in such a domestic corporation only if reciprocity from the foreigner's nation of citizenship
exists. Id.
50. The Desert Land Act requires citizenship in order to make claims on land. Id. at 66-67
(citing 43 U.S.C. § 321 (1988)). Additionally, some states have very stringent restrictions on foreign
ownership of lands. See infra note 54 (discussing an Oklahoma statute restricting the purchase of land
by foreign persons).
51. For example, the International Banking Act of 1978 allows foreign banks to enter the U.S.
only by establishing a federal or state branch or agency; state branches may be subject to added
restrictions on directors and shareholders who are foreign citizens. Subcommittee Report, supra note
18, at 69-70 (Seitzinger, Foreign Investment in the United States: Major Federal Restrictions) (citing
710
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Aside from contending with U.S. federal regulations, the
foreign investor must also deal with state laws which differ in their
treatment of foreign investment. While many state governments
encourage foreign investment in their economies,53 others have
attempted to severely limit foreign investment in their
jurisdictions.5 ' However, state restrictions on foreign investment
may be subject to constitutional challenges under the Commerce
Clause 5 or the Supremacy Clause.
5 6
Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3301 (1988))). Additionally, the National
Bank Act requires that at least two-thirds of directors be U.S. citizens. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 21
(1988)).
52. The Department of Defense's Industrial Security Program regulates government contracts
with business which are foreign owned, influenced, or controlled. ld. at 72. These businesses are not
eligible for government contracts if foreign dominance over the management or operations of the
facility may result in the compromise of classified information or may have an adverse impact on
the performance of classified contracts. Id. (citing Defense Industrial Security Regulation, Department
of Defense 5220.22-R, § 2-201(a)). Additional restrictions are placed on the assignment of duties or
novation under a contract with the federal government Idt (citing 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)).
53. See Fears of Foreigners, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 1991, atI5 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Bus
file) (Some states have even established overseas offices to induce foreign businesses to invest there.
One big limitation to their interest, however, is that the investments must be so-called "'Greenfield
site" investments which establish new business and create new jobs).
54. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, §§ 121-27 (West 1971) (Nonresident aliens may not
own land, and land acquired by such persons by devise or descent must be transferred to a U.S.
citizen). See also, Ohio Foreign Business Acquisitions Act, Ohio Rev. Code §§ 1710.01-.05 (1987)
(The Ohio Department of Development must approve any acquisition of a resident business by a
foreign business not having substantial businesses in Ohio, after extensive disclosure of the proposed
transaction). But see Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735 (S.D. Ohio 1988)
(The Ohio Act was stricken as a violation of the Commerce Clause, which prohibits any state from
discriminating against trade with other states or with foreign countries).
55. "Congress shall have the Power... [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause has been interpreted to be all but exclusive. L. TRInE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw § 6-21, at 468 (2d ed. 1988). There is evidence which suggests that state
restrictions on foreign investment may receive greater scrutiny than is typical of state economic
regulation of interstate commerce. See Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446
(1979). In considering the application of a California ad valorem tax on international shipping, the
U.S. Supreme Court noted that additional factors were necessary beyond the typical interstate
commerce analysis. In particular, the Court mentioned the enhanced risk of multiple taxation by
foreign sovereigns and the possible impairment of federal uniformity in sensitive areas connected with
foreign relations. Id. Additionally, state regulations affecting interstate commerce which facially
discriminate against foreign investors or have discriminatory effects on interstate commerce usually
receive the strictest scrutiny and are invalidated. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935);
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
56. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (The Court struck down an Oregon statute
which conditioned a foreign citizen's right of inheritance on the existence of reciprocal rights granted
to U.S. citizens in the foreigners home country). Because the Oregon statute in Zschernig required
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C. The Rise of Exon-Florio
As foreign acquisitions of U.S. companies grew in the mid-
1980s, so did the number of foreign purchases of defense related
firms." The perceived risks of such acquisitions ignited concerns
by Congress, which began to question the lack of adequate
information58 and the lack of substantive restrictions relating to
foreign investment in the U.S.59 Congressional anxiety was fueled
in particular by the attempted acquisition of Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company' by Sir James Goldsmith, a British-French
financier, and the proposed purchase of Fairchild Semiconductor
Corporation61 by Fujitsu, Ltd. While neither transaction was
"'minute inquiries concerning the actual administration of foreign law," it was held to violate article
I, § 10, of the U.S. Constitution, which entrusts the foreign affairs of the country to the Congress.
Id. In expanding this case, the California Supreme Court invalidated a state government procurement
statute because it attempted to structure national foreign policy to accommodate its own domestic
agenda. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221 (1969). An in-depth
discussion of state restrictions on foreign investment and the potential challenges which might be
raised on Constitutional grounds is beyond the scope of this article. See Note, The Constitutionality
of State Attempts to Regulate Foreign Investment, 99 YALE LJ. 2023 (1990) (discussing potential
constitutional challenges to state restrictions on foreign investment).
57. 135 CONG. REc. H903 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1989) (citing Schwartz, Foreign Ownership of
U.S. Defense Companies, Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute (Feb. 1989)) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Cngres file). The number of foreign acquisitions reported for the years 1983 through 1988
is as follows:
Total Number that were
Year Acquisitions Defense-related







58. See 134 CONG. REc. H9591 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (statement of Rep. Coehlo) ("[lt is
the reaction of an ostrich, and not a sovereign nation, to express indifference at the extent to which
[foreign investment] has grown [in the United States]").
59. See id (statement of Rep. Eckart) ("In Ohio, we call the Golden Rule, 'he who has the
gold rules.' And what comes with foreign ownership? If we have not figured it out yet it is control,
and with control comes a diminution of an important aspect of freedom.").
60. Goodyear was considered important to U.S. national security because of its many contracts
with the Department of Defense. Richardson & Larschan, supra note 16.
61. Fairchild manufactured advanced silicon chips with military applications as well as
maintaining other military contracts. Id
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completed, the Reagan Administration and many legislators
believed that the government lacked the authority, short of
declaring a state of emergency, to block a foreign acquisition on
national security grounds.62 Therefore, with added public support
for restricting foreign investment," Congress enacted Exon-Florio
as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, to
create a mechanism to protect U.S. national security interests from
foreign control.'
62. See 134 CONG. REC. E905 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1988) (statement of Sen. Exon) ("When
I called [the proposed acquisition of Goodyear Tire and Fairchild Semiconductor] to the attention of
the Administration, I was told: 'We can't do anything because they're not [sic] violations of the
antitrust laws. The only way we can do anything is to declare a national emergency, and we think
that would be overreacting.**). The International Emergency Economic Powers Act grants the
President the authority to prohibit transactions provided there exists an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. 50 U.S.C. app. §§
1701-06, amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §
2502(b), 102 Stat. 1107, 1371. However, the President may have had the necessary power to restrict
foreign transactions. See Richardson & Larschan, supra note 16 (The Export Administration Act, for
example, authorizes the President to regulate exports for national security purposes, foreign policy,
and the protection of the U.S. economy from the drain of scarce resources in inflationary pressures.
50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). See also Gruson, Legal Opinions of New York
Counsel in International Transactions, COLUM. Bus. L. REv. at 365 (1989) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1862
(1988) (Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 gives the President broad authority to limit
imports for national security purposes). Section 203(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 grants the President
the power to abrogate agreements in order to remedy serious injury to domestic industry. Id. (citing
19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1988), amended by Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, § 1401, 102 Stat. 1225, 1234)).
63. Polls in 1988 indicated that the majority of Americans have a negative view towards
foreign investment. As many as 51% of U.S. citizens said they were very concerned over the level
of foreign investment in the U.S. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 199 (Thomas, American
Public Opinion Towards Foreign Investment). However, dramatic differences between polls of the
elite and that of the masses may limit the rigidity of these views. Id.
64. Some Congressional leaders argue that Exon-Florio was intended to play a much more
expansive role than simply protecting traditional "'national security" interests. Rep. Cardis Collins,
for example, believes that Exon-Florio was intended to stop foreign businesses from purchasing
high-technology firms in the U.S. for the purpose of transferring technology and production out of
the U.S. and withholding such technology from U.S. customers. Bill Offered to Strengthen Law
Governing Foreign Acquisitions, 23 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at 956 (June 21, 1991).
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Ill. ExoN-FLoRuO
A. The Statute
Exon-Florio authorizes the President of the United States, or his
designee, to investigate and determine the impact on national
security" of any proposed or pending merger, acquisition or
takeover by or with foreign persons which could result in foreign
control of a U.S. person engaged in interstate commerce.66 The
President, or the President's designee, must begin an investigation
within thirty days of receiving written notice of a proposed
acquisition. The investigation must be completed within forty-five
days of its commencement.67 Once the seventy-five days of
potential investigation time expires, the President has fifteen days
to decide whether to impede the transaction.68 Within the fifteen
day period, or any time before the expiration of the investigation,
the President may take any action to suspend or block the foreign
acquisition of a U.S. person engaged in interstate commerce, so
that such control will not threaten to impair the national
security.
69
B. Exon-Florio and the U.S. Constitution
The U.S. Constitution establishes a central system of
government by which specific powers are delegated to the various
branches of government.7" However, the Constitution does not
65. The initial version of the bill would have allowed the Commerce Department to investigate
threats to either national security or essential commerce. However, threatened by a presidential veto,
Congress changed the language to include only threats to national security. Dennin, supra note 7, at
375.
66. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. l § 2170(c). The President must find credible evidence of foreign interests exercising
control over a U.S. person which might threaten to impair the national security, and provisions of
law, other than Exon-Florio and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, do not give
adequate authority for the protection of the national security. Id. § 2170(d).
70. See U.S. CONSr. arts. I-l1 (vesting specific powers in the Congress, Executive and
Judiciary, respectively).
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specifically empower Congress to regulate foreign investment.
71
Congressional authority to regulate foreign investment, therefore,
must be derived from other express powers which arguably are
Congress' power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, 2 to
provide for national defense,73 and to regulate inmigration and
naturalization.74
Congress has the exclusive power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several states.75 In determining
whether an activity affects interstate commerce, the courts no
longer dwell on the question of what is meant by the word
"commerce. ' 7  If Congress either expressly or impliedly
concluded that a particular activity affects interstate commerce, the
courts will defer to their judgment and not reexamine the
question.77
Another potential source of constitutional power to restrict
foreign investment derives from congressional power to raise and
support armies." If Congress determines that foreign investment
impedes the nation's ability to respond to a crisis, this provision
would arguably authorize Congress to prohibit or otherwise restrict
the foreign investment.
79
Finally, Congress has the exclusive power to establish
naturalization and citizenship requirements and to admit or expel
aliens."0 The Supreme Court traditionally viewed congressional
power to regulate the admittance, naturalization, and stay of aliens
as an inherent power of a sovereign nation." Congress may,
71. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (defining congressional powers).
72. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
73. Id. cl. 12.
74. Id cl. 4.
75. Id. cl. 3.
76. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
77. Id.
78. U.S. CoNST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
79. Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 53 (Seitzinger, Foreign Investment in the United
States: Major Federal Restrictions).
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
81. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,603-04 (1889); Subcommittee Report, supra
note 18, at 53 (Seitzinger, Foreign Investment in the United States: Major Federal Restrictions). "6It
is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its
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therefore, place such substantive requirements on the admittance,
naturalization, or stay of aliens, including restrictions on a
foreigner's ability to invest in the U.S., upon its own discretion
with only the most limited review by the Courts."2
Congressional power to regulate foreign investment under
Exon-Florio was delegated to the President. 3 However, because
the constitutional authority to restrict foreign investment lies with
the Legislature, the delegation of power under Exon-Florio must
conform to constitutional standards before the President may
legally exercise the delegated powers.84 Generally, when Congress
delegates power affecting domestic matters, the U.S. Supreme
Court requires that Congress articulate some clear policy objectives
and standards by which to implement the law.85 However, the
Supreme Court has treated congressional delegation of powers
regulating foreign commerce somewhat differently. For example,
dominions, or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to
prescribe." L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 5-16, at 358.
82. In the exercise of its power, Congress may condition entry of an alien upon compliance
with such requirements that would otherwise be held violative of the Constitution if applied to
American citizens. L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 5-16, at 358 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(28)(C),
1251(a)(6)(c), 1424(a)(2)) (providing for the exclusion or deportation of, or denial of naturalization
to, alien members of the Communist Party). Such substantive requirements are viewed similarly to
political questions, which are within the discretion of Congress and not the courts. Id
83. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (authorizing presidential action to suspend or prohibit any
transaction covered by the statute). See also 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g) (authorizing the President to
issue regulations to implement the statute).
84. Executive authority to restrict foreign investment, even under the auspices of national
security, is nonexistent outside of a state of war or a delegation of authority from Congress. "As late
as 1866, it was declared that the President's power as Commander in Chief affected only 'the
command of the forces and the conduct of military campaigns.' " L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 4-7,
at 231 (citing Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 139 (1866)). See Yoshida Int'l v. United States,
378 F. Supp. 1155 (Cost. Ct. 1974), rev'd, 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (President Nixon's
proclamation imposing a tax on imports was held to be unconstitutional).
85. "'[S]ince the contractarian political theory underlying much of American constitutional law
deems consent the only legitimate basis for governmental intrusion into private autonomy, and since
a representative democracy locates consent in the election of legislators and of the chief executive,
it follows that every act taken under color of federal authority, whether undertaken by Congress itself
or by one of its agents, must be meaningfully traceable to a specific exercise of constitutionally
granted legislative or executive power. Thus, the valid exercise of congressionally delegated power
depends upon the prior adoption of [a] declared policy by Congress and its definition of the
circumstances in which its command is to be effective." L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 5-16, at 364
(citing Opp Cotton Mills v. Admin'r, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941)).
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in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,86 the Supreme
Court upheld a law giving the President discretionary authority to
ban arms sales by U.S. businesses to parties involved in the war in
South America. The Court declared that, in matters involving
foreign affairs, the reasonable standards otherwise required for
domestic matters were not necessary. 87 The Exon-Florio
Amendment, therefore, is likely a valid exercise of this
congressional authority, even though it does not articulate clear
standards and policy objectives.
After making the difficult decision of whether to notify the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States of a
proposed or pending transaction, the foreign investor must decide
how much information the notice should disclose. This decision is
particularly onerous since the notice given to the Committee is
potentially the only opportunity the investor has to be heard during
the Committee's review and investigation, and before the President
makes a final determination on whether to block the transaction.88
Such a summary proceeding has the potential to violate the norms
of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Although Congress has
expressly removed judicial review of the findings of the President
under Exon-Florio,8 9 this will not limit the Court's jurisdiction to
review the procedural aspects of the Committee process."
86. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
87. Id. at 316.
88. The Proposed Regulations do not provide for any means of addressing the Committee
except through the voluntary notice provisions. In fact, a member of the Committee may submit
"agency notice" without consultation of the parties to the acquisition. Proposed Regulations, supra
note 9, § 800.401(b). Although, notice of the "agency notice" must be conveyed to all parties
involved in the acquisition. Id. § 800.402(a).
89. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2). Judicial authority to support congressional removal ofjudicial
review on the President's determinations may exist. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (The Court held that determinations made by the President under authority
delegated from Congress, or in his own right as Commander in Chief and as the nation's organ in
foreign affairs, would not be reviewed by the Court. Such decisions are of "a kind for which the
Judiciary has neither the aptitude, facilities, nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong
in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.").
90. See Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (In a challenge to the procedural
requirements afforded claimants under the Medicare Program Part B, the Court held that" 'due
process is flexible and cals for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands'
(citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). We have considered appellees' claims in
light of the strong presumption in favor of the validity of congressional action and consistently with
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Generally, procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment
is violated when federal action deprives a person of a
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest without
appropriate procedures.9' However, a hurdle for the foreign
investor may be the ability to qualify as a person under the Fifth
Amendment.92 While the courts have established that Congress
has broad authority to limit the entry, stay, and naturalization of
aliens,93 once properly admitted, foreigners are afforded the
protections of due process.94 Due process should, therefore,
protect the properly-admitted foreign investor from the deprivation
of property by the U.S. government under Exon-Florio without
adequate procedural safeguards.95 The ultimate issue facing the
court will be what procedures the government will need to provide
foreign investors before preventing an acquisition or forcing the
divestment of an already-completed acquisition.
this Court's recognition of 'congressional solicitude for fair procedure .. " (citing Califano v.
Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 693 (1979)). Appellees simply have not shown that the procedures
prescribed by Congress and the Secretary are not fair or that different or additional procedures would
reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation of Part B benefits.").
91. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
92. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) (Resident aliens are persons for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause); L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 5-16, at 358.
93. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (describing the foundation for congressional
power to regulate the entry, stay, and naturalization of aliens).
94. Resident aliens are afforded due process protection under the Fifth Amendment. Kwong
Hai Chew, 344 U.S. at 596. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) ("[W]hatever his status under
the immigration laws, an alien is surely a 'person' within any ordinary sense of the word" and
should, therefore, be protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Ainendment, as
implied in the Fifth). Therefore, a domestic corporation, controlled by a foreign person for purposes
of Exon-Florio may have a valid constitutional challenge against Exon-Florio's application upon them
as a violation of the equal protection clause. However, a nonresident alien may not enjoy the
procedural protections of due process. L. TRIBE, supra note 55, § 5-16, at 359 (citing Shaughnnessy
v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)).
95. "The Court has also made clear that property interests protected by procedural due process
extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money." Board of Regents, 408 U.S.
at 571. "[The complaining party] must, however, have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must instead have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Id. at 577. The Court has also held that
informal practices and customs would be sufficient to create a legitimate claim of entitlement. Perry
v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972).
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Deciding what procedures are constitutionally required will
depend upon the competing interests involved.96 As the U.S.
Supreme Court said in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,97  "A
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. It is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.", 98  The application of
Exon-Florio would deprive the foreign investor of personal and
possibly real property. Yet, the burden on the government to supply
an appropriate hearing, before a decision making body, could
actually facilitate the fact finding process by the Committee. 99
Moreover, such a hearing would benefit both parties by enabling
specific Committee concerns to be directly addressed and resolved
as well as reduce the foreign investors potential loss of the
acquisition.
C. CFIUS: No Longer Just a Study Group
In May 1975, President Gerald Ford formed the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States [hereinafter CEJUS or the
Committee]. 1" The Committee was established to monitor the
impact of foreign investment in the U.S. as well as to coordinate
U.S. policy on such investment."' CFIUS is an interagency
committee made up of assistant secretary level representatives from
the Treasury, Defense, State, Justice and Commerce Departments,
96. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). What due process requires will be
determined by the following balancing test: The strength of the private interest and the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards will be balanced against the government's interest,
including the burden that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id.
97. 491 U.S. 110, 163 (1989).
98. Md. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)
(overruling Parratt to the extent that Parratt held that a deprivation within the meaning of due
process occurred by mere negligent conduct) (The necessity of quick action, or the impracticality of
providing any meaningful predeprivation process, can, when coupled with a postprocedural remedy,
satisfy procedural due process).
99. The hearing need not be formal. Mathews, 425 U.S. at 334.
100. Exec. Order No. 11,858, supra note 8.
101. Id. § 1(a)(6)(b). See Dennin, supra note 7 ("[S]ince [CFIUS was formed, it] has operated
as an informal working group, with procedures and protocols that have been passed along from
administration to administration by little more than word of mouth").
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as well as from the Office of Management and Budget, the Council
of Economic Advisors, and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative. 1" The Committee, however, has no set ideology,
but is instead the sum of very differing institutional beliefs." 3
Following the passage of Exon-Florio in 1988, President Ronald
Reagan delegated his investigative authority under this Amendment
to the Committee. " In a move that some Congressional leaders
believe was an attempt to limit the potential impact of Exon-Florio
on foreign investment,'0 5  President Reagan designated the
representative of the Secretary of the Treasury as Chairperson of
the Committee,"° as well as directing the Department to
formulate regulations implementing Exon-Florio. 1°7
D. The Regulations
1. Scope
In 1989, the Department of Treasury published the Proposed
Regulations implementing Exon-Florio.0 8 As set out in the
Proposed Regulations, Exon-Florio applies to acquisitions, proposed
or completed, after August 23, 1988. l 9 The Proposed Regulations
102. Dennin, supra note 7.
103. A foreign investor faced with review by the Committee must take this into consideration.
See iL. (A strategy for approaching a Committee review is to target those members that will likely
be most sympathetic to the foreign investor's interests).
104. The authority to delegate presidential power under Exon-Florio is expressly stated in §
2170(a) of the Statute. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c). It is important to note that President Reagan
delegated only the authority to conduct reviews and investigations. Exec. Order No. 12,661, supra
note 8, § 3-201. The Committee is charged with the responsibility of reporting its findings and
recommendations to the President, who has the ultimate authority to prohibit a transaction on national
security grounds. Il
105. See Dennin, supra note 7 (describing the initial debate between Congress and the Reagan
Administration on which department should be in charge of the Committee).
106. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, supra note 8, § 1(6) (The representative shall not be below
that of an assistant secretary).
107. Id.
108. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9.
109. Id. §§ 800.103, .202.
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provide for a voluntary 1 ' system of notice... by the parties to
an acquisition." 2 While the regulations provide for a specific
length of time for the investigation and review process,113 they do
not accord fimality or certainty with respect to the completion of an
investment transaction. This is primarily attributed to the potential
divestiture the foreigner faces if notice is not given.114 Thus,
foreign investors who decide that Exon-Florio does not apply to
110. If a transaction is subject to Exon-Florio, and neither a party to the transaction nor a
Committee member submits notice, the case will remain open and subject to presidential divestiture
if the required findings under this provision are subsequently made. Id. § 800.401. There is
effectively no statute of limitations for completed transactions that fail to give proper notice. Id. §
800.601(d). Additionally, if the notice submitted to the Committee contains false or misleading
information or omits material information, the Committee retains the right to reopen its review or
investigation of the transaction. Id. § 800.601(e)(1). Any Committee member may also resubmit so-
called "agency notice" under § 800.401, to begin the process anew. Id. § 800.601(e)(2). The
President may also take such action for such time as he deems appropriate with respect to the
acquisition, and may revise any earlier actions taken in relation to the transaction. Id. § 800.601(e)(3).
111. Voluntary notice of the proposed or completed acquisition will be fulfilled by sending 10
copies of the information set out in § 800.402 of the Proposed Regulations, to the Staff Chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Office of International Investment. The
notice shall contain such information as the nature and timing of the transaction, detailed information
on the parties, a description of the assets being acquired, the business activity of the acquisition, any
and all contracts held with a military service or the Department of Defense or contracts involving
classified information, any products or services (including research and development) supplied to a
military service or the Department of Defense or that could have military applications, the nature of
the acquirer's business, and detailed information as to the plans the acquirer has for the acquisition
(such as reducing research and development, or selling-off product lines). Proposed Regulations,
supra note 9, § 800.402.
112. Id. § 800.221. Party or parties to an acquisition means:
(a) in the case of an acquisition of a person by the purchase of its voting securities, the
person acquiring the voting securities, and the person issuing those voting securities;
(b) in the case of a merger, the surviving person, and the person which loses its separate
premerger identity;
(c) in the case of an acquisition of an entity or a business of an entity, the person
acquiring that entity or business and the person selling that entity or business;
(d) in the case of a consolidation, the entities being consolidated, and the new
consolidated entity;
(e) in the case of a proxy solicitation (to be determined);
Proxy solicitation is tentatively available as a means for acquiring control. Id. § 800.221 (e). The
Treasury has requested comments on the likelihood that proxy solicitations might be used as a means
to obtain control over a U.S. person by a foreign person, thereby threatening national security. Id.
113. If an investigation is undertaken, it must commence within 30 days of notification. 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170(a). The investigation must be completed within 45 days after such determination.
Id. Within 15 days after the investigation, the President shall announce the decision whether or not
action will be taken to suspend or prohibit the transaction. Id. § 2170(c). The entire process should,
therefore, be completed within 90 days of notification by a party to the transaction.
114. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.601(d).
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their transaction, and therefore do not file notice with the
Committee, are subject to review and possible divestment of their
acquisition indefinitely." 5 Even if foreign investors file notice
with the Committee and an investigation ensues, the Committee
may start the process anew if the notice contained false or
misleading information, omitted material information,"' or there
was a material change in the transaction that was not
communicated to the Committee."17
The power of indefinite review and divestment of completed
transactions forces foreigners to seriously consider the application
of Exon-Florio to a their investment transactions in the U.S. The
Proposed Regulations, however, impede an accurate assessment of
the applicability of Exon-Florio by failing to adequately define
what transactions will be subject to review. The Proposed
Regulations merely mirror Exon-Florio by providing the President
with authority to prohibit an acquisition by a foreign person which
might threaten to impair the national security." 8
2. Defining National Security
The intent of Exon-Florio is to protect the United States from
a perceived harm resulting from a foreign person acquiring control
115. This raises the issue as to whether a foreign investor can actually gain free title to the
assets acquired in the U.S. If foreign investment transactions are indefinitely subject to review, even
if the risk is minute, there is effectively an encumbrance on the title to the property.
116. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.601(e). The regulations do not define "material
information." Without a standard to apply, the foreign investor has no means to measure the potential
risk of failing to provide even seemingly irrelevant information, particularly in light of the
Committee's indefinite review powers if this mythical standard is not followed. The lack of
articulated criteria raises additional concerns about potential shifting standards of review between
administrations.
117. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.701(a). The Regulations also fail to define what
constitutes a material change in the transaction. Because mergers and acquisitions are seldom
completed as initially proposed and most prospering organizations will fluctuate over time, the failure
of the Proposed Regulations to articulate a criterion to determine when a material change in the
transaction has occurred, adds to the foreign investor's risk of future divestiture from changing
emphasis by the Committee or the Administration. Moreover, there is no means by which to discern
whether the demand for notice of material change applies to changes in the entity or simply the actual
agreements which consummated the acquisition.
118. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.101.
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of a U.S. person.119 However, a definition of what constitutes a
threat to national security does not appear in the Statute, the
Proposed Regulations, or the Conference Report. 120 Much of the
debate surrounding the definition of national security stems from
deep-seeded disagreements about U.S. trade and economic
strategies.' For example, there is support in Congress for the
belief that economic security should also be a consideration of
national security." However, according to the Bush
Administration's view, to impose restrictions on foreign investment
under the veil of economic security is merely a means to restrict
free trade."z The Proposed Regulations perpetuate the uncertainty
by reiterating the Conference Report's intention not to create
barriers for foreign investors and the intention that the Committee
would implement the statute only as far as necessary to protect
national security. 2" Moreover, the Conference Report states that
national security is intended to be interpreted without limitation to
particular industries."n The preamble to the Proposed Regulations
also states that notice of a proposed transaction is "clearly
appropriate when, for example, a company is being acquired which
provides products or key technologies essential to the U.S.
119. See infra notes 145-53 and accompanying text (discussing the defmition of a U.S. person).
120. Robert Dean, who served on the National Security Council under President Ronald
Reagan, said that after the Fujitsu situation [discussed supra notes 61-62] an interagency council was
set up to resolve the national security issue by defining those industries important to U.S. national
security. The group ultimately was unable to define general criteria for national security and was
disbanded. See New Omnibus Trade Law Offers Weapon Against Hostile Foreign Takeover Bids, 5
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1483 (Nov. 9, 1988).
121. See generally 134 CoNo. REc. H9581 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1988) (debate concerning the
Foreign Ownership Disclosure Act of 1988).
122. See 134 CoNo. REc. S4532 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1988) (statement of Sen. Byrd) ("Simply
stated, our economic strength and technological leadership are central elements of our national
security ... we need to get beyond the idea that national security is solely a function of how many
troops and weapons we can field. The economic well-being of vital industries must be as much a
national priority as is the maintenance of a strong armed forces establishment").
123. See President's Message Regarding MAMCO, supra note 10 (statement of Press Secretary
Fitzwater). "The President's action in this case does not change our policy and is not a precedent
for the future with regard to direct investment in the United States from the People's Republic of
China or any other country." Id
124. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9.
125. Conference Report, supra note 4.
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industrial base.' ' 126 Unfortunately, all that has been expressly
excluded by the Proposed Regulations are toys, games, food
products, hotels, restaurants, or legal services because they have
"no special relation to national security."127
From a practical stand point, it is difficult to determine how
Exon-Florio will be used. To date, the Committee has considered
540 investment transactions,12 8  of which twelve were
investigated, 129 and only one resulted in presidential action to
force the divestiture of a U.S. asset. 3' The one forced divestiture,
however, stands as a warning to all foreign investors thinking that
their transaction has no national security implication, because
whether control over the acquired company impairs national
security may not matter.
In 1989, China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Company (CATIC) 131 began the process of acquiring control of
MAMCO, Inc., a Seattle, Washington, manufacturer of metal
aircraft components. 132 According to the President of MAMCO,
the company had no classified contracts with the U.S. government,
and the products it manufactured had military application only to
the extent that some parts were used by Boeing Co. for its
commercial aircraft which have military counter parts.13 3 Despite
the apparent lack of security threat resulting from the acquisition
126. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9.
127. Id. Explicitly excluding only these few types of U.S. persons as potential national security
concerns may indicate that this will be the extent of the exclusion. Exon-Florio would, therefore, be
a factor in nearly all foreign investment decisions in the United States.
128. According to a study by the Economic Strategy Institute, the Committee has adopted a
nonreview policy where the investor seeks less than 50% ownership of a particular business.
Therefore, as much as 30% of such "minority investments" go completely unknown to the U.S.
governnent. Testimony of Linda M. Spencer, Adjunct Fellow, Economic Strategy Institute, before
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness 6 (June 12, 1991)
(available from Rep. Collins).
129. "Investigated" means subjected to the 45 day review process.
130. See President's Message Regarding MAMCO, supra note 10 (China National
Aero-Technology was forced to divest its holdings in MAMCO, Inc.).
131. CATIC is an aerospace and aircraft manufacturer which also is a purchasing agent for the
Ministry of Aerospace Industry of the Republic of China. Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law,
Voids Sale of Aviation Concern to China, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
132. Chinese Company Seeking "Solution'to Exon-Florio Divestiture Order, 53 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) No. 10, at 331 (March 5, 1990).
133. Id.
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of MAMCO, notice of the transaction was provided to the
Committee. 13 4 However, CATIC failed to await the Committee's
approval before completing the acquisition. When President Bush
concluded that the acquisition impaired national security, he
ordered CATIC to divest all of its holdings of MAMCO within
three months.'35 The reasons for the order, however, were based
on classified information about some of CATIC's past activities
which raised concerns regarding CATIC's future actions.'36 There
were some reports indicating that the past activity related to
CATIC's purchase of two aircraft engines intended for use in
prototype aircraft."3 7 In violation of agreements with the U.S.,
CATIC disassembled the engines to acquire metallurgical
technology in the design of fuel-mixing chambers.'38 As a
consequence, CATIC was ordered to divest its holdings of
MAMCO, not because of MAMCO's involvement in areas
sensitive to national security, but because of CATIC's prior
activity. Such a basis for implementing Exon-Florio adds
significantly to the concern that the Amendment will subject
foreigners who wish to invest in the U.S. to arbitrary and
potentially inconsistent results.
The inherent problem with failing to accurately define national
security, or even to identify a system of criteria with which to
guide foreign investors, is that it leaves the ultimate determination
of this issue to foreign investors or their attorneys. Undoubtedly,
foreign investors must consider the risk of a future shift in
administration policy which might work to divest their acquisitions
should they fail to give adequate notice to the Committee. To avoid
134. Contrary to reports by the Bush Administration, it was CATIC and not MAMCO that
actually notified the Committee of the pending transaction. Id.
135. Exec. Order No. 12,661, supra note 8. CATIC's forced divestiture should at least be a
lesson in prudence. Benham, Blocked Takeover Fuels Foreign Policy Flap; Was it National Security
or Political Necessity Underlying Action to Reverse Sale?, INvESTOR'S DAILY, Feb. 8, 1990, at 1
(quoting Brad Larschan, Corporate Secretary of the Association of International Investment) (LEXIS,
Nexis library, Invdly file).
136. Exec. Order 12,661, supra note 8, § 3. See, Rosenthal, supra note 131 (A Treasury
Department official, briefing reporters on the presidential order, said the order was based largely on
CATIC's past activities).
137. Benham, supra note 135.
138. Rosenthal, supra note 131.
725
The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 4
this potential loss, foreign investors are essentially forced to submit
notice of their investment activity.
3. Identifying the Parties
The Proposed Regulations attempt to identify transactions
subject to Exon-Florio by illustrating transactions involving the
acquisition of a U.S. person by a foreign person.139 U.S. person
is defined as any entity engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States, irrespective of the nationality of the controlling
party."4 The Proposed Regulations fail to define interstate
commerce, therefore making the scope of this section somewhat
ambiguous. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted
Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce to be very
broad.'41 Consequently, Exon-Florio could arguably apply to
investment transactions solely between foreigners, so long as the
assets being acquired were within the definition of interstate
139. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.301(b). The following transactions are subject
to Exon-Florio:
(1) Proposed or completed acquisitions by or with foreign persons which could or did
result in foreign control of a U.S. person, irrespective of the actual arrangements for
control planned or in place for that particular acquisition.
(2) A proposed acquisition by or with a foreign person, which could result in control
of a U.S. person, including, without limitation, an offer to purchase all or a
substantial portion of the securities of a U.S. person.
(3) Proposed or completed acquisitions even by entities organized in the U.S., if those
entities are "foreign persons," and if those acquisitions could or did result in a new
foreign interest controlling the U.S. person to be acquired.
(4) Proposed or completed acquisitions by or with foreign persons which involve
acquisitions of business and could or did result in foreign control of businesses
located in the U.S.
(5) Joint ventures where a U.S. person and a foreign person enter into contractual or
other similar arrangements, including agreements on the establishment of a new
entity, in circumstances such that a foreign interest would gain control over a
business of a U.S. person.
140. Id. § 800.210.
141. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,311 (1981) (The Court
requires only that there be a rational basis supporting a congressional finding that a regulated activity
effects interstate commerce and that the means used by Congress is reasonably adapted to the end
sought to be achieved).
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commerce. 42 While it might be contended that Congress did not
intend this, one of the transactions which spurred Congress to enact
Exon-Florio was the acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor, a
French-owned company, by Fujitsu, a Japanese corporation.'43
The practical implication of defining a U.S. person so broadly is
that the foreign investor must not only be wary of investments
made within the United States, but also those investments outside
U.S. borders that effect the control of U.S. assets.' 44
The Proposed Regulations define a foreign person as any entity
over which control is or could be exercised by a foreign national,
including a foreign government.1 45 Therefore, even a company
incorporated within the U.S. will be treated as a foreign acquirer
under Exon-Florio if the company is controlled by a foreign person.
Defining control of a U.S. person will, thus, be critical to
determine whether a U.S. company is potentially subject to Exon-
Florio.
4. Control of a U.S. Person
The Proposed Regulations define control as the power, direct
or indirect, whether or not exercised or exercisable through
securities, proxy voting, contractual arrangements, or other means,
to determine, direct, or decide matters affecting the entity. 46 This
142. What is not addressed by the proposed regulations, however, is whether this transaction
might apply to a wholly foreign acquisition of a company which has U.S. subsidiaries that are not
the direct target of the acquisition.
143. See Essaye & Turza, supra note 44.
144. While Congressional concern over the acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor occurred
before Exon-Florio was available, it illustrates Congress' lack of concern that a foreign owned U.S.
corporation is being acquired. Exon-Florio has been used by foreign controlled corporations
attempting to protect themselves from the hostile bid of another foreign entity. See New Omnibus
Trade Law Offers Weapon Against Hostile Foreign Takeover BiL, supra note 120 (Consolidated
Gold Fields, PLC, a corporation organized in the United Kingdom, requested presidential review
under Exon-Florio to block a hostile bid by Minorco, S.A. which was controlled by South African
interests).
145. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.211, 800.212. The codified definition is
circular, defining "foreign person" as a foreign national or any entity over which control is or could
be exercised by a foreign interest. "Foreign interest" is then defined as any foreign person, including
a foreign government. The construction given seems to identify the Treasury's intent. Id.
146. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.213.
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extremely broad definition could be interpreted to limit many
lending arrangements that commonly contain clauses limiting the
borrower's activity, and therefore perhaps controlling the entity as
defined in the Proposed Regulations.147 In addition, Exon-Florio
may also apply where lending agreements give the lender added
rights in the event of default. 148
The ambiguity of determining whether a foreign person controls
a corporation through lending or other agreements could potentially
either discourage foreign investment or make foreign money more
expensive for U.S. companies to borrow. It is not at all clear that
the Committee will go so far as to subject these types of
transactions to review.149  However, considering that certain
provisions within the Proposed Regulations allow indefinite review,
this broad definition of control could effectively allow the President
to impede foreign investment in the United States simply by
reinterpreting key provisions within the statute.
The Proposed Regulations, while including joint ventures within
the scope of Exon-Florio,"50 fail to recognize that generally
parties to a joint venture share equally in the entity.' 5' Although,
by way of illustration, the Proposed Regulations apply Exon-Florio
to a joint venture where an agreement between partners provides
for the exercise of control by one partner, this scenario fails to
address the common circumstance where neither partner has a
contractual right to control over the entity.152 The Proposed
147. Fischler, Exon-Florio Draft Regulations: National Security and Foreign Acquisitions of
U.S. Firms, 11 E. ASIAN B EcunvE REP., Nov. 15, 1990, at 9.
148. Id.
149. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 9 (The preamble adopts the Conference Report's
view that Exon-Florio is not intended to raise obstacles to foreign investment, but more importantly
because the Treasury Department has an institutional interest in maintaining the free flow of capital).
See also Dennin, supra note 7 (Some congressional leaders are concerned by the Treasury's
institutional bias against restricting the free flow of capital).
150. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.301(5).
151. H. HEN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusaNFSS ENTERPRISES
§ 49, at 105-08 (3d ed. 1983).
152. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.301(5). First example: "Corporation A, a
foreign person, and Corporation X, a United States corporation, form a'separate corporation, JV
Corp., to which Corporation X contributes an identifiable business in the United States. There is no
foreign interest which does or could exercise control over Corporation X. Under the Articles of
Agreement of JV Corp., Corporation A through its shareholding in JV Corp. may elect a majority of
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Regulations also expressly exclude the circumstance in a joint
venture that does not result in the possibility of a foreign person
exercising control over the joint venture.153 However, each
illustration defines the opposing ends of a spectrum and does not
explain any of the instances falling between the extremes. Given
the breadth of the Committee's review powers, taking the position
that neither party exercises control could be risky. If a foreigner's
transaction involves a U.S. person that has some possibility of
effecting national security and the only issue is control, the safest
course of action would be to submit notice of the transaction to the
Committee. Unfortunately, the ambiguity in the definition of
control adds to the practical result that Exon-Florio creates a
mandatory system of screening foreign investment in the U.S.
5. Exemptions
Specifically exempted from Exon-Florio are transactions which
involve the purchase of voting securities by a foreign person,
"solely for the purpose of investment." '154 These types of
transactions are exempt only if they involve less than 10% of the
outstanding voting securities of the U.S. company, and the investor
has no intention of being involved in the formulation,
determination, or direction of the fundamental business decisions
of the issuer. 55 However, the Proposed Regulations provide no
guidance as to how an investor can prove his intentions with
respect to the investment. In addition, acquisitions of companies
made directly by institutional investors would not be subject to
review if a significant portion of their business does not involve the
the Board of Directors of JV Corp. The formation of JV Corp. could result in foreign control of a
U.S. person and is an acquisition subject to [Exon-Florio]." I
153. Id. Second example: "Same facts as Example 1, except that, under the Articles of NV
Corp., or pursuant to contractual arrangements between Corporations A and X, all decisions by JV
Corp. identified under § 800.213(a) through (e) [concerning the formation, determination, and
decision making for the entity] may be made only by Corporation X or subject to its veto. The
formation of NV Corp. is not an acquisition subject to [Exon-Florio].'" Md
154. Id. § 800.220 (defining "'solely for the purpose of investment").
155. See id. § 800.302(d).
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acquisition of entities.156  Exon-Florio also exempts so-called
"startup" or "greenfield" investments. 157 Startup or Greenfield
investments are excluded because they are not considered on-going
businesses, and therefore do not qualify as persons engaged in
interstate commerce. 5 Typically greenfield investments involve
the creation of a new business entity to pursue new business
ventures rather than the acquisition of an existing company. 5 9
6. Committee Procedure
As noted in Part I.A., the Committee may investigate and
review a transaction for up to seventy-five days after the filing of
notice."6  This fact can be a decisive tool for a corporation,
foreign or domestic, facing a hostile acquisition.'6' In hostile
acquisitions, speed is the sole technique that a bidder can legally
use to obtain an advantage over competitors. 6 2 Conversely, delay
is the most potent strategy the target company can use for finding
an alternative deal or obtaining a higher price from the original
bidder.' 6 An acquiring entity filing notice with the Committee,
in advance of the tender offer, risks the loss of market opportunity
through delay. Moreover, notice to the Committee in advance of
the tender offer increases the likelihood that information about the
156. Id. § 800.302(d)(2).
157. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.301(b)(4), example 3.
158. Id.
159. See id. (Greenfield or startup investments involve separately arranging for the financing
and construction of a plant to make a new product, buying supplies, hiring personnel, and purchasing
the necessary technology). See also Fear of Foreigners, supra note 53 ("The snag is that most
foreign businesses are not keen on greenfield investments. For them, the United States is a large and
intimidating market. They sensibly prefer to enter it by taking over an American company and so
acquiring experienced staff and existing production and distribution facilities").
160. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (a).
161. The Bush Administration has further compounded this problem by requiring a unanimous
vote of the members of the Committee to clear a transaction without a formal 45 day investigation.
Exee. Order No. 12,661, supra note 8, § 3-201(1)(A)(1)(d). If any member of the Committee wants
to pursue the investigation, the decision whether to investigate must go to the President. Id. §
3-201(1)(A)(1)(c). The President then has 25 days to decide whether to order the investigation. Id.
162. Herzel & Shepro, Negotiated Acquisitions: The Impact of Competition in the United
States, 44 Bus. LAW. 301, 301 (1989).
163. Id
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proposal will leak to the target company as well as to the market.
Either scenario could work to substantially impair the ability of a
foreign person to acquire a U.S. person by means of a tender offer.
The dilemma facing the foreign investor is that failure to provide
notice to CFIUS possibly subjects the acquisition to divestiture. By
increasing the risk associated with using a tender offer to acquire
a U.S. person, as well as increasing the processing fees associated
with complying with Exon-Florio, the cost of acquisitions by tender
offer will be substantially increased.
The Proposed Regulations suggest that persons contemplating
transactions involving entities that operate in areas that do not
appear reasonably related to the national security may seek
guidance from the Staff Chairperson of the Committee.'6 4
However, there is no indication whether this person's
determinations will have a binding effect on the Committee's
investigative powers or the President's divestment authority.' 65
IV. THE FUTURE OF EXON-FLORiO
A. Potential Legislative Changes
Ten months after the initial lapse of the Defense Production
Act,1" Congress reauthorized this statute along with the Exon-
Florio Amendment. 67 Perhaps more importantly was Exon-
Florio's reauthorization retroactive to October 20, 1990168 as well
as the statute being specifically exempted from any future
termination, even if the Defense Production Act otherwise
lapses. 169 The lapse of Exon-Florio had the additional effect of
reigniting Congressional debate on whether Exon-Florio should be
164. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9.
165. The Proposed Regulations provide that divestiture will not be available only when the
Committee has previously determined not to undertake an investigation of the acquisition or the
President has previously determined not to exercise his authority under the statute. Id. § 800.601(d).
166. Pub. L. No. 81-774, 64 Stat. 798 (1988).
167. The Defense Production Act Extension and Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-99,
105 Stat. 487 (1991).
168. Id. § 7, at 490.
169. Id. § 8.
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revised to reflect a more potent limitation on foreign
investment.170
Despite the potential for abuse, only one transaction reviewed
by the Committee resulted in presidential action to force the
divestiture of a U.S. person.'71 While the Administration has
vowed to maintain an open investment policy,172 there is growing
support in Congress for amending Exon-Florio, which has been
criticized as not doing the job that it was intended to
accomplish. 173  As a result, Congress is exploring options to
expand the scope of the Statute.174 The ultimate impact of any
changes to Exon-Florio will of course depend on what Congress
finally adopts. However, the following section explores some of the
proposed changes and the potential impact each may have on the
foreign person planning to invest within the U.S.
One proposed change to Exon-Florio would require the
Committee to investigate and determine the effects on economic
and national security of mergers, acquisitions, and take overs by or
with foreign persons which could result in foreign control or access
to technology of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the
U.S. 175 However, redefining Exon-Florio to protect the economic
170. See Press Conference, Economic Strategy Institute, supra note 24 (statement of Linda
Spencer, Clyde Prestowitz, Reps. Levine and Wolf) (Exon-Florio should be strengthened).
171. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (describing the forced divestiture of
MAMCO, Inc. by China National Aero-Technology).
172. Statement of William E. Barreda, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Trade
and Investment, before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness
of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (June 12, 1991)
(available from Rep. Collins) [hereinafter Barreda Statement].
173. Witnesses Split on Bill to ExpandAuthority to Block Foreign Investment, 22 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 31, 1131 (August 3, 1990). Rep. Bentley said, -CFIUS is not operating the way
those of us who suppoxted the Exon-Florio provision thought it would... [CFIUS*] track record
in allowing the sale of U.S. firns-especially high-tech companies-to foreign buyers is really a
disgrace." Id.
174. See, e.g., H.R. 2386, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991) (expanding the review of
transactions involving the control of a domestic entity by foreign persons from those which might
impair national security to those which might impair the economic and national security of the U.S.
by foreign control or access to technology).
175. Id Introduced by Rep. Levine, cosponsored by Rep. Wolf. See H.R. 5225, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. § 2 (1990) (allowing the President to exercise his authority to block or otherwise impair an
investment transaction if "there is credible evidence that it is likely that the national security might
be impaired by the effect the merger, acquisition, or takeover could have on the industrial and
technology base of the United States").
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stability of the U.S. creates the same inherent problem as the
existing version: deciding what a threat to U.S. national security or
economic stability is.176 Moreover, the attempted expansion of the
scope of Exon-Florio could cause a severe impediment to foreign
investment.
177
Some congressional leaders have also criticized the structure of
the Committee for having a member of the Department of Treasury
as Chairperson.1 78 These Members of Congress perceive that the
Department of Treasury's role in encouraging foreign purchases of
U.S. government treasury bills conflicts with the intended role of
the Chairperson of the Committee to restrict acquisitions which
might impair U.S. national security. 79 As a result, bills have
been introduced in Congress which would replace the representative
of the Department of Treasury as Chairperson with a representative
from the Department of Commerce. 8 However, because the
President has the ultimate determination of whether to block an
acquisition under Exon-Florio, such a shift in leadership could only
have the effect of increasing the intensity and likelihood of
investigations by the Committee. 8 ' In addition, changes in the
176. See supra note 120 (describing the interagency council set up to address national security
issues, which was ultimately unable to define a general criteria for national security and was
subsequently disbanded).
177. In its current version, Exon-Florio has caused most acquirers to file with the Committee
as a protective measure, even in transactions where national security concerns are remote. Banker,
Protection vs. Globalization; The Regulatory Response to Cross-Border Transactions, N.Y.J.,
March 25, 1991, at 7 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lglnew file). This problem would be substantially
compounded if Exon-Floro's scope included the protection of U.S. economic security. Barreda
Statement, supra note 172, at 11.
178. See Press Conference, Economic Strategy Institute, supra note 24 (Remove the Treasury
Department from controlling the Committee Chairperson's position).
179. Id.
180. H.R. 2386,102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(i)(12); HR. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(1991)
See Shear, America Fumbles for Handle on Foreign Investment Mess, Insight, Apr. 1, 1991, at 43
(quoting Kevin Kerns) ("The intent of the Exon-Florio amendment was aimed at protecting
technology. That expertise is in Commerce or Defense, not Treasury"). See also Dennin, supra note
7 (The original intent of Congress, to make the Commerce Department the head of the Committee,
was stifled by President Reagan, who appointed the Department of Treasury to Chairperson).
181. The Lapse of the F&on-Florio Amendment: Its Effect on Transactions and Prospects for
New Legislation, in the American Bar Association Section on International Law and Practice Annual
Spring Meeting (Apr. 24-27,1991) (speech by R. Wall). See Dennin, supra note 7 (Congress believes
that the Department of Commerce would more aggressively enforce the provisions of Exon-Florio).
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general membership of the Committee have also been
recommended.18 2
There is also some support in Congress to alter the powers of
individual members of the Committee.18 3 Currently, for a formal
investigation to ensue, the President must request, or CFIUS must
vote unanimously, to start an investigation of a proposed or
completed transaction under Exon-Florio1& A current proposal
would require an investigation of an investment transaction on the
affirmative vote of any member of the Committee. 18 5 Giving such
unilateral power to each member agency could have the result of
enabling those members who favor greater restrictions on foreign
investment to use Exon-Florio as a means to impede foreigners
from investing in the U.S. simply by more frequently subjecting
acquisitions by foreign persons to the Committee's review process.
Members of Congress have also criticized the President's
decision making criteria.186  Currently, the President, in
determining the impact a particular transaction has on national
security, must consider domestic production needs, the ability and
capacity of domestic industry to meet those needs, and how foreign
control of the U.S. person would affect these factors. 87 If any
credible evidence indicates that such control would threaten to
impair the national security, the President may seek to block or
otherwise restructure the transaction.18 One proposal would
remove the credible evidence standard all together, requiring only
that there be evidence leading the President to conclude that the
acquisition might threaten to impair national security.18 9
Legislation has also been introduced which would require that the
182. See, e.g., M.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (proposing the replacement of the Office
of Management and Budget, Secretary of State, Council of Economic Advisors with the Secretary
of Energy, Assistant to the President on Science and Technology, and National Security Advisor).
183. Id (allowing the vote of any member of the Committee to start the investigative process).
184. Exec. Order 12,661, supra note 8, § 3-201(1)(A)(I).
185. H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2.
186. See Press Conference, Economic Strategy Institute, supra note 24 (statement of Linda
Spencer, Clyde Prestowitz, Reps. Levine and Wolf) (criticizing the lack of long-term perspective on
decisions to block foreign acquisitions).
187. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e).
188. Id. § 2170(d)(1).
189. H.R. 2386, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. § 3(a)(3).
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Committee and the President, in making their determinations to
investigate or block a foreign acquisition, consider the acquisition's
impact on the following: (1) Access to and control of domestic
industries and commercial activity as it affects the technological
and industrial capability of the U.S.; (2) the concentration of
foreign direct investment in the industry and the impact of such
further investment in the industry; (3) the U.S. and world market
positions of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the U.S.
and the foreign persons involved in the transaction under
investigation; and (4) whether the domestic person has received
U.S. Government funds during the ten preceding years. 90
A unique bill proposed in Congress will allow both the
Committee and the President to demand and publish written
assurances from foreign persons that their particular investment
activity will not result in the impairment of U.S. national
security.' The publication of such assurances would be
anticompetitive in that it would allow U.S. companies access to
sensitive business information concerning a foreign purchaser that
would otherwise not be available to foreign persons. Moreover,
requiring such assurances raises questions concerning the
ramifications of a foreign investor who fails to provide adequate
assurances or, after providing such assurances, fails to perform the
assurances adequately."9
B. Recommendations
The debate over Exon-Florio is somewhat ironic. For nearly
half a century the United States has enjoyed, if not relished, the
status of being the predominant economic power in the world
190. Id.; H. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5.
191. H.R. 2624, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2. However, the President may already possess such
power. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (which states that the "President may take such action for such
time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or
takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce ... The President may direct the Attorney
General to seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the district courts of the United
States in order to implement and enforce this section.").
192. See Barreda Statement, supra note 172, at 12-13 ("Such scrutiny is open-ended. How long
would assurances be policed? Under what standards?").
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market, reaping the political influence associated with that power.
This status, however, is changing. The U.S. is no longer the lone
economic voice in the world market. Both Japan and Germany's
prosperity have given each country new found economic power in
the world political scene. For the first time in over fifty years, the
U.S receives more foreign direct investment than American citizens
invest abroad.193 The overly broad Exon-Florio, as well as the
proposed expansions currently pending in Congress, personifies the
American double standard regarding foreign investment: foreign
investment is great, so long as Americans are the foreign investors.
Despite the intentions of some in Congress, Exon-Florio has
been limited to investigating and blocking only those transactions
which pose a legitimate threat to national security. For instance, the
ability of the U.S. to protect itself could be impaired where the
government relies on products or services supplied by a foreign
entity that are vital to the U.S. military or other government
operations. Therefore limiting a foreign person's ability to impede
the U.S. access to such supplies and services is a legitimate use of
Exon-Florio. However, the mere ownership or control of a U.S.
entity which supplies products or services to the U.S. government
poses no legitimate threat to the nation's security. 94 Exon-Florio
should, therefore, limit foreign control of U.S. persons only when
193. See Subcommittee Report, supra note 18, at 124 (Jackson, Foreign Ownership of U.S.
Assets: Pas Presen and Prospects) (citing U.S. Department of Commerce figures). In billions of
dollars:
U.S. Investment Foreign Investment
Abroad in the U.S.
Year Total Direct Total Diet
1930 $ 21.5 $ 8.0 $ 8.4 $ 1.4
1940 34.3 7.3 13.5 2.9
1950 54.4 11.8 17.6 3.4
1960 85.6 31.9 40.9 6.9
1970 165.4 75.5 106.9 13.3
1980 607.1 215.4 500.8 83.0
1988 $1,253.7 $326.9 $1,786.2 $328.9
IL
194. See generally, Note, supra note 25, at 556 ("[M]ost foreign direct investors enter the U.S.
market for business reasons. The decision-making process of these investors, who are primarily
interested in profit, will not be markedly different from those of U.S. investors.... ['lo the extent
that its interest in profit leads to a lack of responsiveness to the concerns of local communities and
citizens and the possibility of conflict with national policies, the foreign-held corporation is no
different from U.S. conglomerates and multinationals.").
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the U.S. person is one of a very small number of suppliers of a
product or service, when the amount of time necessary to develop
the product within the U.S. is unreasonably long, and where there
is no adequate means for stockpiling the product. 95 Where the
product or service falls within one of these categories, the
President, under Exon-Florio, could either obtain assurances of
supply or performance or block the transaction entirely.
There are also risks associated with the removal of, or the
access to, technology by foreign persons. However, those
companies which are associated with the development of sensitive
technologies for the United State are already subject to numerous
restrictions. 9 '
Another legitimate, yet unaddressed, concern centers around the
adequacy and availability of compiled information on the extent of
all foreign investment in the U.S. The availability and access to
information by the U.S. government as a whole has often been
criticized as inadequate to effectively determine the true impact of
foreign investment on the U.S.197  However, the lack of
information as well as the lack of a uniform method for obtaining
such information could easily be integrated into the responsibilities
of the Committee. For example, foreign persons wishing to invest
indirectly in the U.S. could be required to disclose to the
Committee the nature of their transaction and such other ancillary
information as may be determined of importance by the
Committee.198 If, however, the transaction is for the acquisition,
195. Testimony of Theodore H. Moran Before the Commerce, Consumer Protection and
Competitiveness Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee (June 12, 1991)
(available from Rep. Collins). To determine at what point there are too few supplies of a product,
Georgetown Professor on Business Diplomacy and Security Affairs, Theodore H. Moran, offers what
he calls the four-four-fifty rule: "If the largest four firms (or four countries) control less than fifty
percent of the market, they lack the ability to collude effectively even if they wish to exploit or
manipulate recipients. If they control more than fifty percent of the market, they do hold the potential
to coordinate denial, delay, blackmail, or manipulation." Id.
196. See supra note 52.
197. See 134 CoNo. REc. H9581 (daily ed. Oct. 5,1988) (containing a lengthy debate over the
lack of adequate information on foreign investment in the U.S.).
198. Because this proposal would expand the role of the Committee beyond its current
boundaries, the Committee would need to be restructured to allow subcommittees to handle the
gathering and reporting of information collected from foreign investors. Additionally, if such
information is already readily available through another agency or department, the subcommittee
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or results in control, of a U.S. person which the Defense
Department, the Commerce Department, and the National Security
Advisor jointly have determined are either receiving government
grants for research and development of technology vital to U.S.
security, are engaged in producing technologically advanced
products for the U.S. government, or are otherwise determined by
this group to be of vital importance to U.S. national security, such
disclosure of information must occur before the transaction
commences. 1 If the amount of time necessary to complete an
investment is critical to its success, the foreigner should be able to
request the Committee to instigate a preliminary, confidential
review of the transaction. The preliminary review would require the
Committee to immediately determine whether the transaction will
be delayed for investigative purposes. If the Committee chooses not
to delay the transaction at that time, it should convey to the foreign
investor concerns that it has about whether the transaction might
threaten to impair the national security. Providing foreign investors
with this information will allow them to more accurately evaluate
the potential for future divestment by the President. Additionally,
even though a transaction is not initially delayed, a formal
investigation may still be subsequently held if the Committee, by
a majority vote, determines that it is necessary. Those investment
transactions which do not involve businesses represented by the
interagency list will be required to give post-transaction disclosure
to CF1US or a subagency thereof dedicated to the collection of
investment information.
To alleviate the potential for arbitrary and inconsistent
determinations, the Administration or Congress should alter the
Committee's structure into a quasi-judicial body. This quasi-judicial
body should make public nonclassified, non-confidential
information to allow the public to discern the reasons for the
Committee's recommendations with respect to a particular
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could be given the responsibility of collecting the information and publishing reports based upon the
integration of the information collected.
199. This interagency group should be required to publish a list of industries, companies, and
products which are of vital importance to the national security.
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transaction. The Committee's publications could resemble the
rulings issued by the Internal Revenue Service which convey
enough information to the public to interpret the Internal Revenue
Code while still protecting the identity of the parties to the
transaction. These rulings, even though not binding, would attempt
to give guidance to foreign investors, and their attorneys, to
determine whether their transaction may be subject to review under
Exon-Florio, and whether notice should be given to the Committee
of the pending transaction. While the President's ultimate decision
of whether to block a transaction will not be subject to judicial
review, publication of the Committee's review decisions will make
arbitrary and inconsistent determinations politically more difficult.
Moreover, it will afford foreign investors an opportunity to be
heard and a chance to assure the Committee that no actual security
threat exists.
VI. CONCLUSION
Exon-Florio is a necessary restriction on foreign investment,
even for a country committed to free trade. However, without
limiting the scope of this Amendment, the foreign investor is faced
with both uncertainty and the potential of being deprived of
property arbitrarily. Congressional leaders who wish to use this
statute to conduct industrial policy should reconsider their intended
goals. This Amendment, if strictly enforced, will in fact contribute
to the decline of the U.S. economy. Exon-Florio should not focus
on limiting all ownership of U.S. companies which supply services
or products to the defense network because ownership in itself
poses no legitimate security threat the United States. Exon-Florio
should be used to limit foreign control of a U.S. person when that
person is one of a very small number of suppliers of a particular
product or service, when the amount of time necessary to develop
the product within the U.S. is unreasonably long, or where there is
no adequate means for stockpiling the product.
Presently, there is growing support in Congress to use
Exon-Florio to protect not simply a traditional notion of national
security-military readiness-but also to protect perceived threats to
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the U.S. economy and technological leadership. However, the U.S.
economy will not prosper in the future by removing competition
from industry. Nor will depriving the technological industry from
the only readily available source of capital enable it to compete in
the global market. The U.S. will prosper only by becoming more
competitive globally. Becoming competitive will be achieved only
by providing U.S. companies better access to capital and incentives
to grow as well as reemphasizing education. However, using
Exon-Florio to restrict foreigners from participating in the U.S.
market ignores the fundamental issue of why domestic companies
cannot compete in the global market.
The foreign investor, however, may not have the luxury of
awaiting changes to this statute. Because the Bush Administration
appears committed to a free trade policy, any transaction which is
potentially subject to Exon-Florio will most likely not be restricted.
A prudent course of action would be to submit to the Committee
as much information as possible on the pending transaction without
substantially hindering confidential business information, and make
the Committee aware of any changes to the transaction as soon as
possible. Once the Committee has reviewed the transaction and
approved its completion, subsequent reevaluation requires a finding
of omitted material information or submission of false or
misleading information, therefore, a future administration will be
less likely and less able to subsequently reexamine the
transaction.0 0
Wm. Gregory Turner
200. Proposed Regulations, supra note 9, § 800.601(e).
740
